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The complexity that exists at certain levels of businesses once you examine the 
details can be overwhelming. At least it was for me in my experience last semester. 
From January to March, I was an audit intern at PricewaterhouseCoopers. During the 
course of my internship, I worked alongside the audit teams of two separate companies, 
one of them a large, public utility company, and the other a small, private real estate 
investment company. The experiences were very different, and each company had 
different areas of focus that they were involved in. The real estate investment firm was 
mainly focused on fair value calculations and other complex real estate transactions that 
I could only understand on the surface level. The utility company was much more 
massive and would have a similar structure to a lot of public companies. The first 
section of my paper will discuss Real Estate Investment Trusts and other information to 
be aware of when investing in real estate. The next section of my paper will be 
researching the obstacles that companies face as they submit their financial results to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Part of this will have to do with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and how that changed aspects of the filing process. I was 
there for a majority of this period, and got to see the prep and audit work that the team 
provided.  
 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are securities similar to stocks that invest 
directly in real estate property or mortgages. They are something that I heard a lot about 
as I was auditing my real estate client, but I never looked into the strategies and 
concepts behind them any more thoroughly. One reason I thought this would be an 
interesting topic is considering the recent recession we are recovering from. A lot of that 
was due to the improper valuation of real estate, so I figured talking about some of the 
specific problems with REITs and areas of caution when looking at them would be 
relevant. I will discuss some of the metrics used for valuing REITs, which will make it 
easier to understand how they can affect the overall economy. REITs are less risky than 
a lot of possible investments in real estate, so I wanted to research it to learn about a 
few things to be aware of when considering investment risk.  
 REITs are securities and follow the swings of the market, so they can constantly 
be monitored to detect changes in the market. They are the most liquid element of the 
real estate market, and therefore are one of the easiest methods of evaluation. To 
qualify as a REIT, it must pay at least 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends. This will 
likely make the cash flows of REITs more apparent to investors than other investments 
would provide. This could also make them more reliant on external financing and 
leverage to sustain growth within the market. Leverage refers to how much debt a 
company holds, meaning that a portion of earnings is being financed by external money. 
This makes it possible for gains to yield higher results, but it also makes it possible to 
send a company into a much deeper hole if they hit hard economic times (Wei & Yang, 
2012, p. 295). With this high amount of leverage, “REIT valuation should be very 
sensitive to cash flow news” (p. 296).  
The thing about REITs is that they should be less subjective in valuation 
compared to most other businesses. They are based in real property, while other 
businesses have value derived from things such as goodwill or patent technology. 
Goodwill is inherently subjective because it is the additional value that is estimated 
coming from the brand of a company. “Additionally, several studies document a low 
degree of information asymmetry for the REIT industry” (p. 296). This means that most 
often, companies do not have any inside information that could benefit them in 
comparison to other real estate companies. For the most part, everyone is on equal 
ground. For this reason, it seems that companies should be much more dependent on 
news concerning cash flows. Even though REITs are still represented by stocks and so 
they can be swayed by current investor sentiment, it still seems that cash is the driving 
force within the REIT market. With that being said, it is still possible to have these 
similar conditions outside of the REIT market. “Comparing REITs to non-REITs with 
similar degrees of financial leverage, the difference in cash flow components between 
the two groups is insignificant” (p. 296). This shows that even though cash flow news is 
the main factor, the reason that is the case is that leverage is driving it.  
 The reason this comes into play in a recession is that during a recession, 
leverage is implicitly greater than in a time of prosperity. Therefore, investors may be 
more irrational during a recession and quickly pull out or put money in with less thought. 
The value of REITs will be less driven by cash flow news and will be more of a reflection 
of how the rest of the market is moving. That is why when other market sectors are 
starting to fail, most often the housing market will follow the trend.  
 Corporate governance and the nature of the industry can have some strange 
effects on the market that you would not see in other areas. The free cash flow 
hypothesis was proposed by Michael Jensen in 1986. “The free cash flow hypothesis 
states that since managers’ compensation and perquisites are directly tied to the size 
and scope of the firm, self-interested managers, if left unmonitored, will have the 
propensity to increase firm size through acquisitions, although such investments may 
destroy shareholder value” (Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao, 2012, pp. 1953-1954). Since 
then, the use of cash within businesses has been heavily scrutinized to make sure it is 
being properly used and allocated.  
Jarrad Harford is a researcher who came along about 10 years later to test this 
theory. His hypothesis was that managers of cash-rich firms would waste this excess 
cash on acquisitions. The referenced article features a study by Ghosh, Petrova, and 
Xiao. It is testing whether this holds true for REITs, and if so, what would the effect be. 
Corporate finance studies exclude REITs, because of how high their regulation is. That 
is why a separate study such as this must be performed to get all of the data. As I 
mentioned earlier, REITs must pay 90% of taxable income out as dividends to qualify as 
a tax-exempt entity. “Tax-exemption is important for REITs to attract institutional 
clientele” (p. 1954). This is one of the key regulations that will likely prevent corruption 
and misuse of cash within management, because most of it does not allow any 
discretion for how it will be used. Another result from this is that REITs must often go to 
capital markets to try and raise funds for investment, because there is not a lot of 
excess money within the REIT. This means that they are constantly being scrutinized by 
possible investors, so they have a lot of external pressures to provide detailed financial 
statements on a regular basis.  
Some of the regulations are at odds with each other and can have conflicting or 
confusing results. For instance, even though the 90% rule prevents a lot of corruption 
with a large amount of capital, the remaining amount of cash often has incentives for 
misuse by top management. The excess share provision rule states that the five largest 
owners of a REIT cannot hold more than 50% of the outstanding stock. This regulation 
makes it much less favorable for a takeover bid. For this reason, Harford argues that it 
is nearly impossible to convince entrenched managers of REITs to distribute excess 
money to shareholders, instead of using it for acquisitions (p. 1954). They are looking 
out for their own interest of expansion, and could acquire businesses that will do nothing 
but harm. It is often considered healthy for a company to have somewhat regular 
turnover, so within the REIT industry it is less likely that you would be able to revive a 
company once it is failing due to poor management. This is something that investors 
must be cognizant of. It may not be a huge issue, but it still leaves the possibility for 
fraud or misuse of funds to occur.   
All in all, shareholders probably do not need to be any more concerned about the 
structure of REITs than other companies, due to the high required cash payout. It is just 
something that needs to be on everyone’s radar as they are considering investments. 
These researchers tested how large of a concern this was by looking at different REITs 
to determine the effect cash-flow has on bidding for acquisitions. The sample included 
420 instances of REITs that could be observed. It was found that excess cash was 
insignificant when determining acquisitions. This is significant evidence showing that the 
high dividend payouts have much more of an effect in preventing poor acquisitions than 
allowing top management to misuse funds. In addition, it was found that payouts of 
dividends above the required 90% will decrease cash but it will likely lead to higher 
valuations of REITs (p. 1955). That is another incentive for management to send the 
money back to investors rather than foolishly spend it.  
That was a little of the technical background behind REITs, and how they are 
structured for investors to look at. Next I will stay on the topic of real estate, but I will 
discuss a little bit about it from an institutional level. This next referenced article was 
written in 1990, but it has a lot of good information regarding the new technologies that 
were used to evaluate the high level decisions needed for real estate investment. With 
the technologies described being more than twenty years old, it is more important to 
focus on the underlying methods of analysis that were used. The technology will have 
improved significantly since then, but the overall techniques will still be fundamentally 
the same. 
Decision support systems (DSS) are a fundamental analysis tool that can be 
used for real estate portfolio management. These are computer systems that allow 
users to transform data into useful metrics to measure results and perform various 
analyses. Making investment decisions with property can be much more involved than 
with other types of investments. One reason is that transaction costs can be very high 
for real property. These transaction costs “can sometimes exceed seven percent of total 
asset value and 20 percent of equity” (Trippi, 1990, p. 51). In addition, it often involves a 
lot more time with senior management to come to a consensus about acquiring or 
liquidating real estate than would occur for another type of investment. The investment 
into real estate is usually more sensitive to environmental factors, such as general 
business conditions, inflation, or interest rates. Another factor that can make it a more 
time-consuming investment is that information about available investments is often not 
disseminated to all interested parties in a timely manner (p. 51).  
“Because of these factors, financial theorists often characterize the real estate 
income property market as inefficient” (p. 52). REITs would be one investment vehicle 
that would fit into this classification. A lot of DSS’s used for analyzing investments in 
commercial real estate are often focused on the choice phase of the decision process. 
This means the selection of projects is based on how suitable they are for acquisition, 
retention, or improvement. The thing that makes it hard to judge good or bad real estate 
investments is that most of its performance is based on future actions affecting income. 
So a lot of the time, investments are made that look good currently, without proper 
analysis of what could occur in the future. This is one of the reasons that the recent 
recession occurred and everything that happened relating to the housing bubble. 
People speculated based mostly on what the current conditions seemed to be yielding, 
without considering that the values may be inflated or researching the underlying 
problems.  
Coming out of this recent recession, it is a great time to buy, but investors must 
perform their due diligence and research. There are a lot of factors that must be 
considered, but if done right, real estate investment can be a very lucrative field. Now is 
a great time to invest because the interest rates are so low and there are a lot of 
depressed commercial real estate prices. According to Ashlea Ebeling, “If you’re the 
queasy or hands-off type, stick to publicly traded REITs” (Ebeling, 2012, p. 166). So 
most of what I have been talking about with REITs is considered the lower risk option. It 
is still one of the most common investment tools because it more closely resembles 
other investments. There are a lot of riskier options for commercial investment.  
When you buy real estate, you almost always want to have a plan of owning for 
at least ten years, if you want to get the full value from it. There are certain calculations 
that must be taken into effect when investing in property. One of these considerations is 
vacancy rates, which takes into effect the percentage of vacant spots compared to 
occupied spaces over the life of the property (pp. 166-167). This is especially important 
if you are looking at corporate centers or shopping centers, because the opportunity 
cost of not filling all spaces is very high.  
There are a couple terms that are very important when looking at commercial 
loans and preparing for investment. You want to know if the loan is nonrecourse, 
meaning it is secured only by the property and no other assets as well. If it is a recourse 
loan, you need to know if there is a limitation of liability on your other assets if the house 
goes underwater. This could prevent you from losing everything in the case that another 
slump in the housing market occurs. You also need to be aware of technical terms such 
as defeasance penalties, where in certain situations of not paying off a mortgage, you 
are required to substitute the payments with U.S. Treasuries that provide a similar yield 
to that of the mortgage (p. 168). Knowing these situations ahead of time will prepare 
you for the consequences if you are unable to keep up with mortgage payments.  
This concludes my section of the paper on REITs and real estate investment. 
The second half of my paper will focus more on large-scale businesses, discussing the 
obstacles they go through filing financial statements and other reports with the SEC. A 
lot of what I focus on will be regarding how public accounting firms have to deal with 
these challenges as they audit public companies. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was a 
sweeping set of accounting regulations passed in 2002, and this had significant effects 
on most of these areas I will discuss. It was passed down from Congress, and the new 
regulations were aiming to cut down on future corruption within companies by imposing 
controls over the accounting process. They wanted to make it as hard as possible for 
more instances of Enron or WorldCom-type scandals occurring. There are a lot of 
complexities that companies have to deal with on an annual basis, and this will only 
scratch the surface of what can cause problems for both companies and auditors.  
One of the main areas that SOX has had the biggest effect on is the buying and 
selling aspect of the client-auditor exchange. Before SOX, most companies just had 
their executive board meet with public accounting firms to figure out the details for new 
client-auditor engagements. There are new stipulations from SOX that are often referred 
to as “independence” provisions. One of the major changes is that the audit purchase 
decision must be taken out of the hands of the executives, and instead delegated to an 
audit committee which is required to be completely independent of the company. Also, 
CPA firms are not allowed to provide both audit and consulting services to the same 
company. Both of these provisions have changed the entire landscape of how CPA 
firms operate and sell their services, and still leave a lot of possible independence 
issues and conflicts. The following diagram does a great job of showing the pre-SOX 
and post-SOX structures for selling services, and how many members have been added 
to the decision-making process (Jelinek & Jelinek, 2010, 511-513).  
Figure 1. Buying and selling accounting services post Sarbanes-Oxley: 
Understanding both sides of the business exchange (p. 513) 
 
SOX has changed the buyer-seller transaction from a straightforward process to 
a fairly complicated one. Sales researchers would say that a “buying center” is 
emerging on the client side of the exchange. “A buying center is a group of people from 
multiple parts of an organization, assembled to assist in providing different perspectives 
and input regarding an organization’s purchase decision toward increasing the 
likelihood that a correct purchase decision is made” (p. 515). With this new 
arrangement, even though you have multiple people on the audit committee coming 
together to make the decision, it differs from a traditional buying center. In this 
transaction the audit committee is in charge of both authorizing the purchase, and then 
also paying for it. Another main difference is that in this transaction, the company does 
not have any “users” represented in the decision process. No one making the decision 
has any stake in the company, so it is more likely that they would come to an 
unsatisfactory decision for the company (pp. 515-517).  
 One benefit of this new arrangement is that now it is more important for lower-
level employees within the client company to voice their concerns and observations so 
that some insiders are still able to affect future decisions being made. On the other side, 
audit companies must closely monitor their account management approaches. It is 
especially important to identify potential clients with complex buying situations. This will 
help them more effectively plan, staff, and train for future engagements. They must also 
come up with very detailed questionnaires about things like how often the CEO/CFO 
report to the audit committee, and how they will structure the balance between either 
audit services or consulting services (pp. 520-521). So overall, these new regulations 
are probably better in preventing corruption and collusion, but it still leaves a lot of 
problems that companies must find solutions for. I think it will take a while for companies 
to adapt to these changes and run as efficiently as possible, but they will be able to 
figure it out. The more efficient it is, the more money both sides will bring in.  
 This next section will talk a little bit about violations of federal securities laws, and 
steps that can be taken to try and prevent more of them from occurring. The view is 
often that the SEC is unsuccessful in its efforts to deter violations, especially as of late. 
Most of the criticism deals with the severity of the sanctions against wrongdoers. “As 
with all law enforcement authorities, settlements account for the vast majority of 
dispositions of SEC cases that end with sanctions” (Becker, 2012, p. 1849). The point of 
this article is to urge the academic community to think about SEC deterrence more 
comprehensively, including looking at the reasons behind violations to try and prevent 
them before they occur. According to Becker, it has long seemed that securities 
violations increase during times of rapid economic change, where there is a lot of 
money moving around in the economy. That explains why often right before recessions 
you have times of extreme prosperity. People start speculating and being more careless 
with money. This often goes hand-in-hand with less regulation, and can lead to more 
fraud and violations. According to Becker, it often seems that the most difficult people to 
deter from crime are the ones that are impulsive and irrational, giving into economic 
pressures in order to save themselves or their companies from failures (p. 1851).  
 SOX laid out a few new provisions that relate to whistleblowers or people that are 
harmed by securities violations. Section 308 granted the SEC with the power to create 
“Fair Funds”. This allows them to add on civil penalties in enforcement actions, which 
they distribute to harmed investors (p. 1855). This satisfied some of the public demand 
for greater accountability and punishments. Another provision is that whistleblowers 
reporting securities violations are able to collect a portion of the money collected if the 
case goes to trial and is settled. This hasn’t led to as many new reports as was desired, 
but it is still a good step in trying to ensure that people are not withholding information, 
but are reporting everything to the SEC. These provisions along with others are meant 
to prevent as many violations as possible, and create a system that will prevent a future 
Enron case from happening. It is not possible to stop all fraud, but hopefully these steps 
will make it harder to commit violations.  
 This next section will talk a little about the reasons behind late filings with the 
SEC, and how the market usually reacts to these late filings. There are certain reasons 
for late filings that will cause severe reactions, and other that aren’t as severe. Late 
filings are going to occur, but companies need to make sure they alert the SEC if it is 
going to happen. They must provide a reason for the late filing, along with requesting an 
extension. The filing deadlines became stricter after SOX, going from 90 to 60 days 
after fiscal year end for the filing of the 10-K, and 45 to 40 days after fiscal quarter end 
for the 10-Q. The accelerated filing deadlines now make it much more likely that firms 
will file late, at least until they all are able to fully adjust to the new regulations (Cao, 
Calderon, Chandra, & Wang, 2010, p. 189).  
 Because timeliness is such an important factor determining securities price, it is 
expected that late filings would cause a significant negative market response. This 
study was meant to determine the differences in impacts depending on whether the 
reason for filing late was due to information systems (IS) or accounting issues. The IS 
environment is prevalent in every area of business today, so failures in this could lead to 
serious impacts across an entire organization. It could be argued that IS issues are 
signs of more serious financial reporting issues than would be evident from accounting 
issues (p. 190).  
 This study documents significant negative stock market reactions to late filings 
for both quarterly and annual reports. “In particular, the market response is significantly 
more negative for IS related issues versus accounting and other reasons” (p. 190). 
Even with these results, they did not find any financial distress for the company 
associated with this market response. They also found that the market reaction is more 
significant for smaller firms (p. 190). After spending my last few months at two different 
accounting internships, it is no surprise to me that IS issues are considered much more 
severe than accounting issues. A lot of times, the accounting issues I notice or hear 
about are ones that are due to an error in judgment or a mistake, but not anything that is 
wrong with the entire system. However, with an IS issue, it is more likely that an entire 
system that is implemented within a company could have inherent problems. This can 
lead to problems down the line as well, and needs to be fixed as soon as possible to 
mitigate damages.  
 Another interesting thing in the article relates to a previous study that looked at 
the results of 58 industrial firms filing for bankruptcy between 1975 and 1981. It was 
found that a “significant number of bankrupt firms delay releasing their annual reports 
for the final fiscal year before bankruptcy, and that some even file for bankruptcy before 
the release of the report” (p. 193). This shows that tracking late filings might be a more 
significant metric than it often appears on surface level. Of course it is not clear 
evidence that a company is headed for bankruptcy just because of a late filing. This is 
highly unlikely, but to get more information, you can look deeper at the reasoning 
behind the late filing. “As Information Systems have direct effects on a company's 
internal control over financial reporting, addressing IS issues may resolve some SOX 
related and internal control issues” (p. 205). There are many reasons that companies 
can fail or face financial distress, and there is not a simple formula that will give you the 
answer. However, as investors, it is important to know many different factors that could 
affect companies adversely. This is just one of the ways that being more knowledgeable 
about reasons behind late filings can tell you a lot more about a company than it seems 
at first glance.  
 This final section will look more closely at the decision by the SEC to accelerate 
the filing deadlines for the 10-K following SOX. They argued that it would increase the 
relevance of the disclosures, which would make the reports more useful. This study 
tracks changes in reporting quality and information content, and also the actual result 
that the change did have on representational faithfulness and relevance (Doyle & 
Magilke, 2013, p. 549). Starting with companies that had fiscal years ending after 
December 15, 2003, the SEC accelerated the deadline to file the 10-K from 90 to 75 
days for accelerated filers (market capitalization of at least $75 million). After December 
15, 2006, this deadline went down to 60 days for any firms with a market capitalization 
of at least $700 million (p. 550).  
 The worry about this change was that it would compromise the quality of the 
reports. To test the overall usefulness of this acceleration, the study looks at the 
absolute value of the three-day market reaction to the 10-K filing. They compared 
companies that accelerate their 10-K filings that year to similar companies that did not 
accelerate that year. Small accelerated filers experience a decrease of -0.78% in 
market reaction in the year that they accelerated their filings, relative to the companies 
that did not accelerate their filings. This shows that the costs of accelerating the filings 
outweigh the supposed benefits that the SEC claimed would occur. For the large 
accelerated filers, moving from 90 days to 75 days yielded no significant differences. 
However, for the firms that further went down to 60 days, there is an increase in the 
reaction of 0.46%, relative to the sample that did not accelerate their filings. It is hard to 
tell whether this result is because it will take more than a year for the differences 
between 75 and 60 days to take effect, or whether 60 days really does yield more 
benefits due to the increased timeliness (p. 551).  
 A little bit more detailed analysis showed that both small and large firms that 
accelerated from 90 to 75 days experienced significant decreases in reporting quality. 
However, once the large companies’ reporting requirements went down to 60 days, the 
reporting quality actually increased (p. 552). These are interesting yet somewhat 
confounding results. It doesn’t clearly show one way or the other whether the 
accelerated deadlines were more helpful or harmful overall. It seems to point to the fact 
that large companies are able to handle the shorter time period, and it sometimes even 
benefits them. However, small companies are most often harmed by having to 
accelerate their filing deadlines. The first study that I looked at tested what the market 
reaction was for companies that file late. This study was for companies that file on time, 
which is still critical information because it shows us that filing on time is not the only 
factor to consider. The quality of the report is crucial, and can be easily detected within 
a few days of release. This highlights the importance of the audit process, and that 
companies must remain efficient as the timeline shortens, so that the report is not 
released before it is fully prepared and ready. 
 This paper was meant to research a couple accounting topics that I had an 
interest in coming out of my internship. I knew that REITs are a good investment option 
for a more risk-averse investor, but I did not know a lot of the more detailed things to 
consider when looking at REITs. I tried to provide a guideline of some things to consider 
when looking at them. The reason I included the second half of my paper was because 
Sarbanes-Oxley is a common topic, and I often heard people during my internship 
discuss some of the implications it has had. That is why I wanted to research a little bit 
more about some of the major changes it has caused, and how that directly affected the 
relationship between CPA firms and other companies. It is very interesting to research 
some of the areas that could be impacting me as I start a career in public accounting. I 
tried to provide enough information that someone outside of accounting would find this 
interesting, have a much better understanding of both of the topics, and hopefully 
motivate someone to take a closer and more detailed look into these subject areas.  
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